Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

acceptedVersion

Publication Date

6-2011

Abstract

Using concepts from game theory, political economy, law and economics and the economics of asymmetric information, we describe the economics of one of the most famous trials in history—that of the Athenian philosopher Socrates. We discuss the question of whether Socrates’ actions during his trial were rational, using two different models. Our analysis sheds some light on institutional efficiency in trials that followed the classical Athenian pattern.

Keywords

Trial, Jury preferences, Private information, Ancient athens, Socrates, Rationality, Common Knowledge

Discipline

Behavioral Economics

Research Areas

Applied Microeconomics

Publication

European Journal of Law and Economics

Volume

31

Issue

3

First Page

249

Last Page

264

ISSN

0929-1261

Identifier

10.1007/s10657-010-9151-5

Publisher

Springer

Embargo Period

1-21-2020

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-010-9151-5

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