Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
6-2011
Abstract
Using concepts from game theory, political economy, law and economics and the economics of asymmetric information, we describe the economics of one of the most famous trials in history—that of the Athenian philosopher Socrates. We discuss the question of whether Socrates’ actions during his trial were rational, using two different models. Our analysis sheds some light on institutional efficiency in trials that followed the classical Athenian pattern.
Keywords
Trial, Jury preferences, Private information, Ancient athens, Socrates, Rationality, Common Knowledge
Discipline
Behavioral Economics
Research Areas
Applied Microeconomics
Publication
European Journal of Law and Economics
Volume
31
Issue
3
First Page
249
Last Page
264
ISSN
0929-1261
Identifier
10.1007/s10657-010-9151-5
Publisher
Springer
Embargo Period
1-21-2020
Citation
GUHA, Brishti.
Preferences, prisoners and private information: was socrates rational at his trial?. (2011). European Journal of Law and Economics. 31, (3), 249-264.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2339
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-010-9151-5