Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

1-2011

Abstract

In a team project with significant complementarities between various players' individual tasks, news of early success by some encourages others to push ahead with their own tasks while lack of success has the opposite effect. This ex-post disparity in incentives created gives rise to two differing implications, ex ante, for an ideal team transparency. Sometimes it is better to commit to complete secrecy within the team of the various participants' interim progress as it mitigates the negative effect of failures. In some other situations, commitment to full disclosure is better as players are then encouraged to be proactive by exerting efforts in the early rounds and motivate other team members into continued activities by way of interim progress. Transparency (of outcomes) thus has double edges -- it can boost incentives or dampen incentives.

Keywords

Team project, Complementarity of tasks, Transparency of outcomes, Markov strategies

Discipline

Behavioral Economics | Economics

Research Areas

Applied Microeconomics

Publication

Journal of Public Economics

Volume

95

Issue

7-8

First Page

531

Last Page

542

ISSN

0047-2727

Identifier

10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.01.009

Publisher

Elsevier

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.01.009

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