Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

1-2012

Abstract

In a joint project involving two players of a two-round effort investment game with complementary efforts, transparency, by allowing players to observe each other's efforts, achieves at least as much, and sometimes more, collective and individual efforts relative to a nontransparent environment. Without transparency, multiple equilibria can arise, and transparency elimites the inferior equilibria. When full cooperation arises only under transparency, it occurs gradually: No worker sinks in the maximum amount of effort in the first round, preferring instead to smooth out contributions over time. If the players' efforts are substitutes, transparency makes no difference to equilibrium efforts.

Discipline

Behavioral Economics | Economics

Research Areas

Applied Microeconomics

Publication

International Economic Review

Volume

53

Issue

4

First Page

1257

Last Page

1286

ISSN

0020-6598

Identifier

10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00720.x

Publisher

Wiley

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00720.x

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