Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
1-2012
Abstract
In a joint project involving two players of a two-round effort investment game with complementary efforts, transparency, by allowing players to observe each other's efforts, achieves at least as much, and sometimes more, collective and individual efforts relative to a nontransparent environment. Without transparency, multiple equilibria can arise, and transparency elimites the inferior equilibria. When full cooperation arises only under transparency, it occurs gradually: No worker sinks in the maximum amount of effort in the first round, preferring instead to smooth out contributions over time. If the players' efforts are substitutes, transparency makes no difference to equilibrium efforts.
Discipline
Behavioral Economics | Economics
Research Areas
Applied Microeconomics
Publication
International Economic Review
Volume
53
Issue
4
First Page
1257
Last Page
1286
ISSN
0020-6598
Identifier
10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00720.x
Publisher
Wiley
Citation
BAG, Parimal and PEPITO, Nona.
Peer transparency in teams: Does it help or hinder incentives?. (2012). International Economic Review. 53, (4), 1257-1286.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2322
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00720.x