Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

acceptedVersion

Publication Date

5-2016

Abstract

In a two-player team project with efforts over two rounds, we demonstrate that observability of peer efforts can be strictly harmful if preferences are utilitarian. This contrasts with Mohnen et al. (2000) who show in a similar setting that observability of interim efforts induces more efforts, if team members are inequity-averse.

Keywords

transparency, team, perfect substitution, free-riding

Discipline

Behavioral Economics

Research Areas

Applied Microeconomics

Publication

Economics Letters

Volume

144

Issue

1

First Page

88

Last Page

91

ISSN

0165-1765

Identifier

10.1016/j.econlet.2016.05.005

Publisher

Elsevier

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.05.005

Share

COinS