Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
5-2016
Abstract
In a two-player team project with efforts over two rounds, we demonstrate that observability of peer efforts can be strictly harmful if preferences are utilitarian. This contrasts with Mohnen et al. (2000) who show in a similar setting that observability of interim efforts induces more efforts, if team members are inequity-averse.
Keywords
transparency, team, perfect substitution, free-riding
Discipline
Behavioral Economics
Research Areas
Applied Microeconomics
Publication
Economics Letters
Volume
144
Issue
1
First Page
88
Last Page
91
ISSN
0165-1765
Identifier
10.1016/j.econlet.2016.05.005
Publisher
Elsevier
Citation
BAG, Parimal and PEPITO, Nona.
Harmful transparency in teams. (2016). Economics Letters. 144, (1), 88-91.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2319
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.05.005