Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
5-2019
Abstract
This note studies the testable implications of the theory of stable matchings intwo-sided matching markets with one-sided preferences. Our main result connects therevealed preference analysis to the well-known lattice structure of the set of stablematchings, and tests the rationalizability of a data set by analyzing the joins andmeets of matchings.
Keywords
revealed preference, stable matchings, one-sided preferences, lattice structure
Discipline
Econometrics | Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
First Page
1
Last Page
25
Publisher
SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series
Citation
HU, Gaoji; LI, Jiangtao; and TANG, Rui.
The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences. (2019). 1-25.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2303
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Comments
Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2020. DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.015