Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

7-2019

Abstract

We consider a general social choice environment that has multiple agents, a finite set of alternatives, independent types, and atomless type distribution. We show that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism, there exists an equivalent deterministic mechanism that (1) is Bayesian incentive compatible; (2) delivers the same interim expected allocation probabilities and the same interim expected utilities for all agents; and (3) delivers the same ex ante expected social surplus. This result holds in settings with a rich class of utility functions, multidimensional types, interdependent valuations, and in settings without monetary transfers. To prove our result, we develop a novel methodology of mutual purification, and establish its link with the mechanism design literature.

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

Publication

Econometrica

Volume

87

Issue

4

First Page

1367

Last Page

1390

ISSN

0012-9682

Identifier

10.3982/ECTA14698

Publisher

Econometric Society

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA14698

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