Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

5-2019

Abstract

A social choice rule is said to be mixed Bayesian implementable if one can design a mechanism (or institution) in which the set of all mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with that specified by the rule. The objective of this paper is to generalize the results of mixed Bayesian implementation. By means of example, I first assess the implication of common priors in Bayesian implementation. Second, I identify a mild condition that fills the gap between the necessity and sufficiency for mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments including non-economic ones. Third, I establish some new results to unify the literature of Bayesian implementation and Nash implementation.

Keywords

Bayesian implementation, Closure, Incentive compatibility, Mixed Bayesian monotonicity, Nash implementation, Social choice set

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

Publication

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volume

82

First Page

247

Last Page

263

ISSN

0304-4068

Identifier

10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.03.003

Publisher

Elsevier

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.03.003

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