Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

acceptedVersion

Publication Date

7-2019

Abstract

We study random mechanism design in an environment where the set of alternatives has a Cartesian product structure. We first show that all generalized random dictatorships are strategy-proof on a minimally rich domain if and only if the domain is a top-separable domain. We next generalize the notion of connectedness (Monjardet, 2009) to establish a particular class of top-separable domains: connected domains, and show that in the class of minimally rich and connected domains, the multidimensional single-peakedness restriction is necessary and sufficient for the design of a flexible random social choice function that is unanimous and strategy-proof. Such a flexible function is distinct from generalized random dictatorships in that it allows for a systematic notion of compromise. Our characterization remains valid (under an additional hypothesis) for a problem of voting with constraints where not all alternatives are feasible (Barbera et al., 1997).

Keywords

Generalized random dictatorships, Top-separability, Separability, Multidimensional single-peakedness, Connected+ domains, Voting under constraints

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

Publication

Journal of Economic Theory

Volume

182

First Page

25

Last Page

105

ISSN

0022-0531

Identifier

10.1016/j.jet.2019.04.003

Publisher

Elsevier

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.04.003

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