Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

submittedVersion

Publication Date

12-2008

Abstract

We consider a deterministic evolutionary model where players form expectations about future play. Players are not fully rational and have expectations that change over time in response to current payoffs and feedback from the past. We provide a complete characterization of the qualitative dynamics so induced for a two strategy population game, and relate our findings to standard evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium selection when agents have rational forward looking expectations.

Keywords

evolutionary games, dynamic systems, bounded rationality

Discipline

Behavioral Economics

Research Areas

Applied Microeconomics

Publication

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Volume

32

Issue

12

First Page

3877

Last Page

3894

ISSN

0165-1889

Identifier

10.1016/j.jedc.2008.04.003

Publisher

Elsevier

Embargo Period

4-9-2019

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2008.04.003

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