Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
submittedVersion
Publication Date
12-2008
Abstract
We consider a deterministic evolutionary model where players form expectations about future play. Players are not fully rational and have expectations that change over time in response to current payoffs and feedback from the past. We provide a complete characterization of the qualitative dynamics so induced for a two strategy population game, and relate our findings to standard evolutionary dynamics and equilibrium selection when agents have rational forward looking expectations.
Keywords
evolutionary games, dynamic systems, bounded rationality
Discipline
Behavioral Economics
Research Areas
Applied Microeconomics
Publication
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Volume
32
Issue
12
First Page
3877
Last Page
3894
ISSN
0165-1889
Identifier
10.1016/j.jedc.2008.04.003
Publisher
Elsevier
Embargo Period
4-9-2019
Citation
ANTOCI, Angelo; GAY, Antonio; LANDI, Massimiliano; and SACCO, Pier Luigi.
Global analysis of an expectations augmented evolutionary dynamics. (2008). Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. 32, (12), 3877-3894.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2251
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2008.04.003