Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

1-2017

Abstract

This paper explores whether and how corruption and competition-for-promotion motives affect urban land supply in the People's Republic of China. Conditional on demand-side factors, we find that corruption is highly correlated with an increase in land supply. The corruption effects are strongest for commercial land, followed by residential land, and then industrial land. To shed light on the competition motives among prefectural leaders, we examine how the number of years in office affects land supply and distinguish among different hypotheses. Our empirical results show robust rising trends in land sales. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that among prefectural leaders the impatience and anxiety in later years from not being promoted may contribute to an increase in land sales revenue in later years. We also find that prefectural leaders may aim for more land sales revenue over their first few years in office instead of seeking higher revenue in their first 1–2 years.

Keywords

Land supply, China, Political factors, Institution, Monocentric-city model

Discipline

Asian Studies | Political Economy | Public Economics | Real Estate

Research Areas

Applied Microeconomics

Publication

Asian Development Review

Volume

34

Issue

2

First Page

152

Last Page

183

ISSN

0116-1105

Identifier

10.1162/adev_a_00098

Publisher

MIT Press

Copyright Owner and License

Publisher

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1162/adev_a_00098

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