Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
9-2018
Abstract
We study the random assignments of bundles with no free disposal. The key difference between the setting with bundles and the setting with objects (see Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001)) is one of feasibility. The implications of this difference are significant. First, the characterization of sd-efficient random assignments is fundamentally different. Second, a possibility result in the setting with objects fails in the setting with bundles. However, in the setting with bundles, we are able to identify a preference restriction, called essential monotonicity, under which the random serial dictatorship rule (extended to the setting with bundles) is equivalent to the probabilistic serial rule (extended to the setting with bundles). This equivalence implies the existence of a rule on this restricted domain satisfying sd-efficiency, sd-strategy-proofness, and equal treatment of equals. Moreover, this rule selects only random assignments which can be decomposed as convex combinations of deterministic assignments.
Keywords
Random assignments, bundles, decomposability, sd-efficiency, sd-strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals
Discipline
Economics | Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
First Page
1
Last Page
43
Publisher
SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series, No. 18-2018
City or Country
Singapore
Citation
CHATTERJI, Shurojit and LIU, Peng.
Random assignment of bundles. (2018). 1-43.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2201
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.