Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

acceptedVersion

Publication Date

5-2016

Abstract

This paper considers a dynamic environment with interdependent valuations and evolving private information. Under the assumption of “independent types”, we construct an efficient, incentive-compatible mechanism that is also budget-balanced in every period of the game. Our mechanism works in environments where in each period, each agent observes her own realized outcome-decision payoff from the previous period. This extends the insight of Mezzetti (2004) to the dynamic setting.

Keywords

Dynamic mechanism design, Efficiency, Observable payoff, Incentive compatibility, Budget balance

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

Publication

Games and Economic Behavior

Volume

97

First Page

166

Last Page

173

ISSN

0899-8256

Identifier

10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.008

Publisher

Elsevier

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.008

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