Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
5-2016
Abstract
This paper considers a dynamic environment with interdependent valuations and evolving private information. Under the assumption of “independent types”, we construct an efficient, incentive-compatible mechanism that is also budget-balanced in every period of the game. Our mechanism works in environments where in each period, each agent observes her own realized outcome-decision payoff from the previous period. This extends the insight of Mezzetti (2004) to the dynamic setting.
Keywords
Dynamic mechanism design, Efficiency, Observable payoff, Incentive compatibility, Budget balance
Discipline
Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
Publication
Games and Economic Behavior
Volume
97
First Page
166
Last Page
173
ISSN
0899-8256
Identifier
10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.008
Publisher
Elsevier
Citation
HE, Wei and LI, Jiangtao.
Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations. (2016). Games and Economic Behavior. 97, 166-173.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2198
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.008