Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
2-2018
Abstract
We study the classical house exchange problem (Shapley and Scarf (1974)) and identified a large class of rules, each of which is strategy-proof, efficient, and individually rational with single-peaked preferences. These rules are generalisations of Gale’s top trading cycles rule: In each step a subset of houses are allowed to be traded along top trading cycles and in particular, the next step subset of trading houses may depend on the exchanges happened already. We believe that the flexibility introduced by this class of rules is desirable when the designer faces some context-specific requirements.
Keywords
Top trading cycles, strategy-proof, single-peaked
Discipline
Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
First Page
1
Last Page
20
Embargo Period
5-10-2018
Citation
LIU, Peng.
A large class of strategy-proof exchange rules with single-peaked preferences. (2018). 1-20.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2176
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.