Publication Type

Working Paper

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

2-2018

Abstract

We study the classical house exchange problem (Shapley and Scarf (1974)) and identified a large class of rules, each of which is strategy-proof, efficient, and individually rational with single-peaked preferences. These rules are generalisations of Gale’s top trading cycles rule: In each step a subset of houses are allowed to be traded along top trading cycles and in particular, the next step subset of trading houses may depend on the exchanges happened already. We believe that the flexibility introduced by this class of rules is desirable when the designer faces some context-specific requirements.

Keywords

Top trading cycles, strategy-proof, single-peaked

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

First Page

1

Last Page

20

Embargo Period

5-10-2018

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

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