Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
3-2014
Abstract
A social choice rule is said to be implementable if one can design a mechanism(or institution) in which the set of outcomes prescribed by a given solutionconcept coincides with that specified by the social choice rule. I adoptinterim equilibrium (i.e., Bayesian Nash equilibrium where each agent’s interimbeliefs do not necessarily admit a prior) as the solution concept andinvestigate the corresponding implementation problem in general incompleteinformation environments. I identify arguably the weakest set of conditionsunder which implementation in interim equilibrium is possible. By doingso, I also unify the literature of the so-called Bayesian implementation andNash implementation.
Keywords
closure, convex range property, implementation, interim equilibrium, interim incentive compatibility, interim equilibrium monotonicity, intersection property, Nash implementation, no-worst-rule condition, social choice set
Discipline
Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
First Page
1
Last Page
46
Citation
KUNIMOTO, Takashi.
Interim equilibrium implementation. (2014). 1-46.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2072
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Takashi_Kunimoto/publication/260602860_Interim_Equilibrium_Implementation/links/0c960531d35be7dc8b000000.pdf