Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

submittedVersion

Publication Date

6-2020

Abstract

I estimate a matching model of business‐partnership formation to quantify the relative importance of productivity gains, financing gains, and the coordination failure of effort provision (moral hazard) among partners. Productivity gains account for 61% of the gain from the observed partnerships. For partners in the first quartile of the wealth distribution, however, financing accounts for 93% of the gain. The cost of moral hazard corresponds to 42% of the entire gain from partnerships. A loan policy specifically targeting partnerships is less effective in improving welfare than a conventional loan policy that provides loans to individual entrepreneurs.

Keywords

Partnership, productivity, financial constraints, moral hazard, entrepreneurship, matching

Discipline

Entrepreneurial and Small Business Operations | Finance | Industrial Organization

Research Areas

Applied Microeconomics

Publication

RAND Journal of Economics

Volume

51

Issue

2

First Page

531

Last Page

562

ISSN

0741-6261

Identifier

10.1111/1756-2171.12324

Publisher

Wiley

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12324

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