Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
11-2013
Abstract
This paper shows how property rights security improves over time as a result of increasing legal quality and political democratization in a political economy context, where political and legal institutions adapt to evolving factor composition of land and capital in the dynamic economic development process. There seems to exist a clear sequence of di⁄erent forms of protection in that it is unlikely to have a strong rule of law with an exploitative political regime, or to have a democratic political system when the distribution of potential coercive power is too skewed. The routine form of protection thus shifts from coercion to politics and then to law. The predictions of the model are consistent with general historical patterns in England.
Keywords
Property Rights, Coercion, Politics, Law, Democratization, Factor Composition, Monarchy, Democracy, Suffrage Extension.
Discipline
Political Economy | Property Law and Real Estate
Research Areas
Applied Microeconomics
First Page
1
Last Page
24
Citation
HUANG, Fali.
From coercion to politics to law: The evolution of property rights protection. (2013). 1-24.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2059
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://economics.smu.edu.sg/sites/default/files/economics/Events/APCC2013/Papers/7Dec/3_huang_fali.pdf