Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
1-2003
Abstract
We characterize incentive compatibility in multi-unit auctions with multi-dimensional types. An allocation mechanism is incentive compatible if and only if it is nondecreasing in marginal utilities (NDMU). The notion of incentive compatibility we adopt is dominant strategy in private value models and ex post incentive compatibility in models with interdependent values. NDMU is the following requirement: if changing one buyer’s type, while keeping everyone else’s types the same, changes this buyer’s allocation then the new allocation must be relatively more attractive (or relatively less unattractive) to this buyer. We also establish a price characterization of incentive compatible mechanisms.
Keywords
dominant strategy, ex post incentive compatibility, multi-unit auctions
Discipline
Economic Theory | Strategic Management Policy
Research Areas
Economic Theory
First Page
1
Last Page
28
Citation
BIKHCHANDANI, Sushil; CHATTERJI, Shurojit; and SEN, Arunava.
Incentive compatibility in multi-unit auctions. (2003). 1-28.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2022
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
http://164.67.163.139/documents/areas/fac/dotm/bio/pdf_SB13.pdf