Publication Type

Working Paper

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

3-2017

Abstract

Incentives are essential to promote labor productivity. We implemented a two-stage field experiment to measure effects of career and wage incentives on productivity through self-selection and causal effect channels. First, workers were hired with either career or wage incentives. After employment, a random half of workers with career incentives received wage incentives and a random half of workers with wage incentives received career incentives. We find that career incentives attract higher-performing workers than wage incentives but do not increase productivity for existing workers. Instead, wage incentives increase productivity for existing workers. Observable characteristics are limited in explaining the selection effect.

Keywords

Career incentive, wage incentive, internship, self-selection, labor productivity

Discipline

Labor Economics

Research Areas

Applied Microeconomics

Issue

IZA DP No. 10644

First Page

1

Last Page

59

Publisher

IZA DP No. 10644

City or Country

Bonn

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

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