Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
5-2008
Abstract
Maskin and Tirole [Maskin, E., Tirole, J., 1999. Unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts. Review of Economic Studies, 66, 83–114] show that indescribability does not matter for contractual incompleteness when there is symmetric information both at the contracting stage and at the trading stage. Following their setup, I show that with asymmetric information at both stages, indescribability can matter.
Keywords
Asymmetric information, Incentive compatibility, Incomplete contracts, Indescribability, Individual rationality
Discipline
Behavioral Economics | Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
Publication
Economics Letters
Volume
99
Issue
2
First Page
367
Last Page
370
ISSN
0165-1765
Identifier
10.1016/j.econlet.2007.08.007
Publisher
Elsevier
Citation
KUNIMOTO, Takashi.
Indescribability and asymmetric information at the contracting stage. (2008). Economics Letters. 99, (2), 367-370.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2007
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.08.007