Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
3-2013
Abstract
We study a mechanism design problem where arbitrary restrictions are placed on the sets of first-order beliefs of agents. Calling these restrictions Δ, we use Δ-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003, [5]) as our solution concept, and require that a mechanism virtually implement a socially desirable outcome. We obtain two necessary conditions, Δ-incentive compatibility and Δ-measurability and show that the latter is satisfied as long as a particular zero-measure set of first-order beliefs is ruled out. In environments allowing small transfers of utility among agents, these two conditions are also sufficient.
Keywords
Wilson doctrine, Mechanism, design, Robust virtual implementation, Δ-rationalizability, Incentive compatibility, Measurability, Type diversity
Discipline
Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
Publication
Journal of Economic Theory
Volume
148
Issue
2
First Page
424
Last Page
447
ISSN
0022-0531
Identifier
10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.015
Publisher
Elsevier
Citation
ARTEMOV, Georgy; KUNIMOTO, Takashi; and SERRANO, Roberto.
Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine. (2013). Journal of Economic Theory. 148, (2), 424-447.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2002
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.015