Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
3-2004
Abstract
We show the robustness of the Walrasian result obtained in models of bargaining in pairwise meetings. Restricting trade to take place only in pairs, most of the assumptions made in the literature are dispensed with. These include assumptions on preferences (differentiability, monotonicity, strict concavity, bounded curvature), on the set of agents (dispersed characteristics) or on the consumption set (allowing only divisible goods).
Keywords
Bargaining, Competition, Exchange, Decentralization
Discipline
Economic Theory
Research Areas
Applied Microeconomics
Publication
Journal of Economic Theory
Volume
115
Issue
1
First Page
78
Last Page
88
ISSN
0022-0531
Identifier
10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00131-5
Publisher
Elsevier
Citation
KUNIMOTO, Takashi and SERRANO, Roberto.
Bargaining and competition revisited. (2004). Journal of Economic Theory. 115, (1), 78-88.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2000
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00131-5