Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

2-2011

Abstract

In this paper we consider the standard voting model with a finite set of alternativesA and n voters and address the following question: what are the characteristics ofdomains D that induce the property that every strategy-proof social choice functionf : Dn → A satisfying unanimity, has the tops-only property? We first impose aminimal richness condition which ensures that for every alternative a, there exists anadmissible ordering where a is maximal. We identify conditions on D that are sufficientfor strategy-proofness and unanimity to imply tops onlyness in the general case of nvoters and in the special case, n = 2. We provide an algorithm for constructing tops-onlydomains from connected graphs with elements of A as nodes. We provide severalapplications of our results. Finally, we relax the minimal richness assumption andpartially extend our results.

Keywords

Voting rules, Strategy-proofness, Restricted domains, Tops-only domains

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

Publication

Economic Theory

Volume

46

Issue

2

First Page

255

Last Page

282

ISSN

0938-2259

Identifier

10.1007/s00199-009-0509-2

Publisher

Springer Verlag (Germany)

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0509-2

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