Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
submittedVersion
Publication Date
7-2014
Abstract
A domain of preference orderings is a random dictatorship domain if every strategy-proof random social choice function satisfying unanimity defined on the domain is a random dictatorship. Gibbard (1977) showed that the universal domain is a random dictatorship domain. We ask whether an arbitrary dictatorial domain is a random dictatorship domain and show that the answer is negative by constructing dictatorial domains that admit anonymous, unanimous, strategy-proof random social choice functions which are not random dictatorships. Our result applies to the constrained voting model. Lastly, we show that substantial strengthenings of linked domains (a class of dictatorial domains introduced in Aswal et al., 2003) are needed to restore random dictatorship and such strengthenings are "almost necessary".
Keywords
Strategy-proofness, Random social choice functions, Random dictatorship
Discipline
Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
Publication
Games and Economic Behavior
Volume
86
First Page
212
Last Page
236
ISSN
0899-8256
Identifier
10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.017
Publisher
Elsevier
Citation
CHATTERJI, Shurojit; SEN, Arunava; and ZENG, Huaxia.
Random dictatorship domains. (2014). Games and Economic Behavior. 86, 212-236.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1888
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.017