Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
submittedVersion
Publication Date
7-2006
Abstract
We characterize dominant-strategy incentive compatibility with multidimensional types. A deterministic social choice function is dominant-strategy incentive compatible if and only if it is weakly monotone (W-Mon). The W-Mon requirement is the following: If changing one agent's type (while keeping the types of other agents fixed) changes the outcome under the social choice function, then the resulting difference in utilities of the new and original outcomes evaluated at the new type of this agent must be no less than this difference in utilities evaluated at the original type of this agent.
Keywords
dominant-strategy implementation, multi-object auctions
Discipline
Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
Publication
Econometrica
Volume
74
Issue
4
First Page
1109
Last Page
1132
ISSN
0012-9682
Identifier
10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00695.x
Publisher
Econometric Society
Citation
BIKHCHANDANI, Sushil; CHATTERJI, Shurojit; LAVI, Ron; MU'ALEM, Ahuva; NISAN, Noam; and SEN, Arunava.
Weak monotonicity characterizes deterministic dominant-strategy implementation. (2006). Econometrica. 74, (4), 1109-1132.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1887
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00695.x