Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
6-2006
Abstract
We show that a perfect correlated equilibrium distribution of an N-person game, as defined by Dhillon and Mertens (1996) can be achieved using a finite number of copies of the strategy space as the message space.
Keywords
correlated equilibrium, perfection, hierarchy of beliefs
Discipline
Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
Publication
Economic Theory
Volume
28
Issue
2
First Page
475
Last Page
479
ISSN
0938-2259
Identifier
10.1007/s00199-005-0630-9
Publisher
Springer Verlag (Germany)
Citation
CHATTERJI, Shurojit and GOVINDAN, Srihari.
Message spaces for perfect correlated equilibria. (2006). Economic Theory. 28, (2), 475-479.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1886
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0630-9