Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
8-2003
Abstract
In this paper, we introduce the notion of a linked domain and prove that a non-manipulable social choice function defined on such a domain must be dictatorial. This result not only generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem but also demonstrates that the equivalence between dictatorship and non-manipulability is far more robust than suggested by that theorem. We provide an application of this result in a particular model of voting. We also provide a necessary condition for a domain to be dictatorial and use it to characterize dictatorial domains in the cases where the number of alternatives is three.
Keywords
social choice functions, strategyproof, dictatorship, Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, restricted domains
Discipline
Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
Publication
Economic Theory
Volume
22
Issue
1
First Page
45
Last Page
62
ISSN
0938-2259
Identifier
10.1007/s00199-002-0285-8
Publisher
Springer
Citation
ASWAL, Navin; CHATTERJI, Shurojit; and SEN, Arunava.
Dictatorial domains. (2003). Economic Theory. 22, (1), 45-62.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1883
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/ 10.1007/s00199-002-0285-8