Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
2-2017
Abstract
We address a standard random assignment problem (Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001)) and search forsd-strategy-proof, sd-efficient and sd-envy-free or equal-treatment-of-equals rules.Our main result is that on a connected domain (Sato (2013)),if there exists a rule satisfying these axioms, this domain is endowed with a restricted tier structure.Furthermore, we show that, on such a domain, the Probabilistic Serial rule is the unique rulethat satisfies these axioms.As an extension, we introduce outside options to the model, and establish the same characterizations.
Keywords
Random Assignment, sd-strategy-proof, sd-efficient, sd-envy-free, equal-treatment-of-equals
Discipline
Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
First Page
1
Last Page
41
Citation
LIU, Peng and ZENG, Huaxia.
Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure. (2017). 1-41.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1860
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Comments
Also presented at ICSE '06: 28th International Conference on Software Engineering: 20-28 May 2006, Shanghai, China