The Myerson value for complete coalition structures
Publication Type
Journal Article
Publication Date
12-2011
Abstract
In order to describe partial cooperation structures, this paper introduces complete coalition structures as sets of feasible coalitions. A complete coalition structure has a property that, for any coalition, if each pair of players in the coalition belongs to some feasible coalition contained in the coalition then the coalition itself is also feasible. The union stable structures, which constitute the domain of the Myerson value, are a special class of the complete coalition structures. As an allocation rule on complete coalition structures, this paper proposes an extension of the Myerson value for complete coalition structures and provides an axiomatization.
Keywords
Union stable structure, Complete coalition structure, The Myerson value, Potential
Discipline
Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
Publication
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
Volume
74
Issue
3
First Page
427
Last Page
443
ISSN
1432-2994
Identifier
10.1007/s00186-011-0371-4
Publisher
Springer Verlag (Germany)
Citation
UI, Takashi; KOJIMA, Hiroyuki; and KAJII, Atsushi.
The Myerson value for complete coalition structures. (2011). Mathematical Methods of Operations Research. 74, (3), 427-443.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1856
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-011-0371-4