Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
5-2016
Abstract
This paper proves the following result: every path-connected domain of preferences that admits a strategy-proof, unanimous, tops-only random social choice function satisfying a compromise property is single-peaked. Conversely, every single-peaked domain admits a random social choice function satisfying these properties. Single-peakedness is defined with respect to arbitrary trees. The paper provides a justification of the salience of single-peaked preferences and evidence in favor of the Gul conjecture (Barber\303\240 2010).
Keywords
Random social choice functions, strategy-proofness, compromise, single-peaked preferences
Discipline
Economics | Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
Publication
Theoretical Economics
Volume
11
Issue
2
First Page
711
Last Page
733
ISSN
1933-6837
Identifier
10.3982/TE1972
Publisher
Wiley
Citation
CHATTERJI, Shurojit; SEN, Arunava; and ZENG, Huaxia.
A Characterization of Single-Peaked Preferences via Random Social Choice Functions. (2016). Theoretical Economics. 11, (2), 711-733.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1844
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.3982/TE1972