Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
submittedVersion
Publication Date
6-2009
Abstract
In this article, we argue that weak property rights over transnational pollution and the limited threat of retaliatory punishments blunts the effectiveness of a broad-based multilateral agreement to deliver the emission reductions required to mitigate climate change. Instead, we propose a policy framework that builds on unilateral commitments, endogenous innovation and technology transfer that could lead to cumulative emissions reduction by altering the participation constraints of nations over time.
Keywords
Climate, Cumulative, Emissions, Global, Negotiations, Reduction, Technology, Unilateralism
Discipline
Economic Theory | Public Economics
Research Areas
Economic Theory
Publication
CESifo Economic Studies
Volume
55
Issue
2
First Page
286
Last Page
305
ISSN
1610-241X
Identifier
10.1093/cesifo/ifp009
Citation
CHATTERJI, Shurojit and Ghosal, Sayantan.
Technology, Unilateral Commitments and Cumulative Emissions Reduction. (2009). CESifo Economic Studies. 55, (2), 286-305.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1792
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1093/cesifo/ifp009