Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
submittedVersion
Publication Date
5-2013
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate domains that admit “well-behaved” strategy-proof social choice functions. We show that if the number of voters is even, then every domain that satisfies a richness condition and admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function, must be semi-single-peaked. Conversely every semi-single-peaked domain admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function. Semi-single-peaked domains are generalizations of single-peaked domains on a tree introduced by Demange (1982).
Keywords
Strategy-proofness, Restricted domains, Semi-single-peaked domains
Discipline
Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
Publication
Journal of Economic Theory
Volume
148
Issue
3
First Page
1050
Last Page
1073
ISSN
0022-0531
Identifier
10.1016/j.jet.2012.10.005
Publisher
Elsevier
Citation
CHATTERJI, Shurojit; SANVER, Rezmi; and SEN, Arunava.
On Domains that Admit Well-Behaved Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions. (2013). Journal of Economic Theory. 148, (3), 1050-1073.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1790
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.10.005