Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

acceptedVersion

Publication Date

2-2018

Abstract

We study the standard voting model with randomization. A Random Social Choice Function (or RSCF) satisfies the tops-only property if the social lottery under each preference profile depends only on the peaks of voters' preferences. We identify a general condition on domains of preferences (the Interior Property and the Exterior Property) which ensures that every strategy-proof RSCF satisfying unanimity has the tops-only property. We show that our condition applies to important classes of voting domains which include restricted connected domains (Sato, 2013) and the multi-dimensional single-peaked domain (Barberà et al., 1993). As an application of our result, we show that every ex-post efficient and strategy-proof RSCF defined on the multi-dimensional single-peaked domain is a random dictatorship.

Keywords

Random Social Choice Functions, Unanimity, Strategy-proofness, Tops-only Property, Interior Property, Exterior Property

Discipline

Economic Theory

Research Areas

Economic Theory

Publication

Games and Economic Behavior

First Page

413

Last Page

435

ISSN

0899-8256

Identifier

10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.011

Publisher

Elsevier

Embargo Period

11-30-2015

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.011

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