Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
11-2010
Abstract
We explore what group reputation is and model its formation and evolution. Based solely on group signals, we define a player’s group reputation as the belief that others have about the characteristics of the group the player belongs to. A model of group reputation of civil servants with anonymous matching and external monitoring is constructed to characterize the strategic behavior of potential bribers and civil servants, the corresponding levels of corruption, possible anti-corruption policies, and the effects of these policies. Our results indicate that as there are two types of corruption behavior of civil servants: accepting bribes and dereliction of duty, anti-corruption should work along both lines.
Keywords
Group Reputation, Anonymous Matching, External Monitoring, Corruption
Discipline
Behavioral Economics | Economics
Research Areas
Applied Microeconomics
First Page
1
Last Page
21
Citation
WANG, Huan and ZHANG, Yi.
Group Reputation, Anonymous Matching, and External Monitoring in a Model of Corruption. (2010). 1-21.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1473
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.