Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
submittedVersion
Publication Date
5-2012
Abstract
Parental involvement in marriage matchmaking may distort the optimal spouse choice because parents are willing to substitute love for money. The rationale is that the joint income of married children can be shared among extended family members more easily than mutual attraction felt by the couple themselves, and as a result, the best spouse candidate in the parents' eyes can differ from what is optimal to the individual, even though parents are altruistic and care dearly about their children's welfare. We find supporting evidence for this prediction using a unique sample of urban couples in China in the early 1990s.
Keywords
Marriage Outcome, Match-Making Method, Parental Involvement, China, Agency Cost
Discipline
Asian Studies | Behavioral Economics
Research Areas
Applied Microeconomics
Publication
American Economic Review
Volume
102
Issue
3
First Page
555
Last Page
560
ISSN
0002-8282
Identifier
10.1257/aer.102.3.555
Publisher
American Economic Association
Citation
HUANG, Fali; JIN, Ginger; and XU, Lixin Collin.
Love and Money by Parental Match-Making: Evidence from Urban Couples in China. (2012). American Economic Review. 102, (3), 555-560.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1422
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.3.555