Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
submittedVersion
Publication Date
12-2012
Abstract
We characterize the class of dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (or strategy-proof) random social choice functions in the standard multi-dimensional voting model where voter preferences over the various dimensions (or components) are lexicographically separable. We show that these social choice functions (which we call generalized random dictatorships) are induced by probability distributions on voter sequences of length equal to the number of components. They induce a fixed probability distribution on the product set of voter peaks. The marginal probability distribution over every component is a random dictatorship. Our results generalize the classic random dictatorship result in Gibbard (1977) and the decomposability results for strategy-proof deterministic social choice functions for multi-dimensional models with separable preferences obtained in LeBreton and Sen (1999).
Keywords
Strategy-proofness, Lexicographically separable preferences, Generalized random dictatorship
Discipline
Economics | Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
Publication
Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume
48
Issue
6
First Page
353
Last Page
366
ISSN
0304-4068
Identifier
10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.08.001
Publisher
Elsevier
Citation
CHATTERJI, Shurojit; ROY, Souvik; and SEN, Arunava.
The Structure of Strategy-Proof Random Social Choice Functions over Product Domains and Lexicographically Separable Preferences. (2012). Journal of Mathematical Economics. 48, (6), 353-366.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1405
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.08.001