Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
6-2012
Abstract
Even risk-neutral individuals can insure themselves against crimes by combining direct expenditure on security with costly diversification. In such cases — and even when one of these options is infeasible — greater policing often actually encourages private precautions.
Keywords
Crime, Policing, Private precautions, Moral hazard, Diversification
Discipline
Behavioral Economics
Research Areas
Applied Microeconomics
Publication
Economics Letters
Volume
115
Issue
3
First Page
455
Last Page
459
ISSN
0165-1765
Identifier
10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.105
Publisher
Elsevier
Citation
GUHA, Brishti and GUHA, Ashok S..
Crime and Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence?. (2012). Economics Letters. 115, (3), 455-459.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1350
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.105