"Crime and Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private " by Brishti GUHA and Ashok S. GUHA
 

Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

6-2012

Abstract

Even risk-neutral individuals can insure themselves against crimes by combining direct expenditure on security with costly diversification. In such cases — and even when one of these options is infeasible — greater policing often actually encourages private precautions.

Keywords

Crime, Policing, Private precautions, Moral hazard, Diversification

Discipline

Behavioral Economics

Research Areas

Applied Microeconomics

Publication

Economics Letters

Volume

115

Issue

3

First Page

455

Last Page

459

ISSN

0165-1765

Identifier

10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.105

Publisher

Elsevier

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.105

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