Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
5-2010
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate domains that admit “well-behaved” strategy-proof social choice functions. We show that if the number of voters is even, then every domain that satisfies a richness condition and admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function, must be semi-single-peaked. Conversely every semi-single-peaked domain admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function. Semi-single-peaked domains are generalizations of single-peaked domains on a tree introduced by Demange (1982
Keywords
Strategy-proofness, Restricted domains, Semi-single-peaked domains
Discipline
Economic Theory
Research Areas
Economic Theory
First Page
1
Last Page
28
Publisher
SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series, No. 07-2010
City or Country
Singapore
Citation
CHATTERJI, Shurojit; SANVER, Remzi; and SEN, Arunava.
On Domains that Admit Well-Behaved Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions. (2010). 1-28.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1229
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Comments
Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.10.005