Publication Type
Working Paper
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
7-2007
Abstract
This paper provides a theoretical framework of dispute settlement to explain the surge in blocking incidence of GATT panel reports during the 1980s and the variations in withdrawn incidence versus total disputes across different decades of the GATT regime. The study first suggests the role of the degree of legal controversy over a panel ruling in determining countries' incentives to block (appeal) a panel report under the GATT (WTO) regime. The study then analyzes the effects of political power on countries' incentives to use, and their interactions in using, the dispute settlement mechanism, when two-sided asymmetric information exists regarding panel judgment.
Keywords
Dispute settlement, legal controversy, block, appeal, two-sided asymmetric information, political cost
Discipline
Dispute Resolution and Arbitration | International Business | International Economics
Research Areas
International Economics
First Page
1
Last Page
30
Publisher
SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series, No. 21-2007
City or Country
Singapore
Citation
CHANG, Pao-Li.
The Evolution and Utilization of the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism. (2007). 1-30.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1036
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Included in
Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, International Business Commons, International Economics Commons
Comments
Published in Trade Disputes and the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO: An Interdisciplinary Assessment. 2009. Bingley: Emerald, pp.91-118. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1574-8715(2009)0000006007