Publication Type

Journal Article

Publication

Singapore Law Journal (Lexicon)

Publication Date

6-2024

Abstract

The 2015 EWCA decision of Salt v Stratstone Specialist Ltd (t/a Stratstone Cadillac Newcastle) [2015] EWCA Civ 745 casts doubt on the proposition that an inordinate lapse of time alone could operate as a bar to rescission. The court grounded the operation of delay in the doctrine of laches, but as this paper will find, laches is an unsatisfactory explanation for the effect of mere delay on one’s powers of rescission, requiring something more than lapse of time alone. Other competing theories like reference to the Limitation Act 1959 by analogy, and the Sale of Goods Act 1979, have been raised by commentators but each of these prove to be deficient in their own way. In light of their shortcomings, the overlaps between the doctrinal bases and requirements of delay and the other bars to rescission, this paper makes the case for the rejection of mere delay as a bar to rescission, should the issue arise in the Singapore courts. More broadly, the issue of delay is also one that is not adequately addressed in the broader statutory scheme, across the Limitation Act 1959, the Misrepresentation Act 1973, and the Sale of Goods Act 1979.

Disciplines

Asian Studies | Contracts

Subject(s)

Applied or Integration/Application Scholarship

ISSN/ISBN

2737-5048

Publisher

SMU Lexicon, SMU School of Law

Version

publishedVersion

Copyright Holder

Singapore Management University

Format

application/PDF

Volume

4

Page

118-170

Share

COinS