Publication Type
Conference Proceeding Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
7-2018
Abstract
Dual receiver encryption (DRE), proposed by Diament et al. at ACM CCS 2004, is a special extension notion of public-key encryption, which enables two independent receivers to decrypt a ciphertext into a same plaintext. This primitive is quite useful in designing combined public key cryptosystems and denial of service attack-resilient protocols. Up till now, a series of DRE schemes are constructed with bilinear pairing groups. In this work, we introduce the first construction of lattice-based DRE. Our scheme is secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks from the standard Learning with Errors (LWE) assumption with a public key of bit-size about 2nmlogq, where m and q are small polynomials in n. Additionally, for the DRE notion in the identity-based setting, identity-based DRE (ID-DRE), we also give a lattice-based ID-DRE scheme that achieves chosen-plaintext and adaptively chosen identity security based on the LWE assumption with public parameter size about (2ℓ+1)nmlogq, where ℓ is the bit-size of the identity in the scheme.
Keywords
Lattices, Dual receiver encryption Identity-based dual receiver encryption, Learning with errors
Discipline
Information Security
Research Areas
Cybersecurity
Areas of Excellence
Digital transformation
Publication
Proceedings of the 23rd Australasian Conference, ACISP 2018 Wollongong, Australia, July 11-13,
First Page
520
Last Page
538
ISBN
9783319936383
Identifier
10.1007/978-3-319-93638-3_30
Publisher
Springer
City or Country
Cham
Citation
ZHANG, Daode; ZHANG, Kai; LI, Bao; LU, Xianhui; XUE, Haiyang; and LI, Jie.
Lattice-based dual receiver encryption and more. (2018). Proceedings of the 23rd Australasian Conference, ACISP 2018 Wollongong, Australia, July 11-13,. 520-538.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/9192
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93638-3_30