Publication Type
Conference Proceeding Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
5-2017
Abstract
Since 2003, the U.S. government has spent $850 million on the Megaport Initiative which aims at stopping the nuclear smuggling in international container shipping through advanced inspection facilities including Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) and Mobile Radiation Detection and Identification System (MRDIS). Unfortunately, it remains a significant challenge to efficiently inspect more than 11.7 million containers imported to the U.S. due to the limited inspection resources. Moreover, existing work in container inspection neglects the sophisticated behavior of the smuggler who can surveil the inspector’s strategy and decide the optimal (sequential) smuggling plan. This paper is the first to tackle this challenging container inspection problem, where a novel Container Inspection Model (CIM) is proposed, which models the interaction between the inspector and the smuggler as a leader-follower Stackelberg game and formulates the smuggler’s sequential decision behavior as a Markov Decision Process (MDP). The special structure of the CIM results in a non-convex optimization problem, which cannot be addressed by existing approaches. We make several key contributions including: i) a linear relaxation approximation with guarantee of solution quality which reformulates the model as a bilinear optimization problem, ii) an algorithm inspired by the Multipleparametric Disaggregation Technique (MDT) to solve the reformulated bilinear optimization, and iii) a novel iterative algorithm to further improve the scalability. Extensive experimental evaluation shows that our approach can scale up to realistic-sized problems with robust enough solutions outperforming heuristic baselines significantly.
Keywords
Container inspection, Game theory, Nuclear smuggling
Discipline
Artificial Intelligence and Robotics | Theory and Algorithms | Transportation
Research Areas
Intelligent Systems and Optimization
Areas of Excellence
Digital transformation
Publication
Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017: Sao Paulo, May 8-12
First Page
669
Last Page
677
ISBN
9781510855076
Publisher
IFAAMAS
City or Country
San Diego
Citation
WANG, Xinrun; GUO, Qingyu; and AN, Bo.
Stop nuclear smuggling through efficient container inspection. (2017). Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017: Sao Paulo, May 8-12. 669-677.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/9166
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Included in
Artificial Intelligence and Robotics Commons, Theory and Algorithms Commons, Transportation Commons