Publication Type
Conference Paper
Version
submittedVersion
Publication Date
6-2003
Abstract
Agents in a peer-to-peer system typically have incentives to influence its network structure, either to reduce their costs or increase their ability to capture value. The problem is compounded when agents can join and leave the system dynamically. This paper proposes three economic mechanisms that offset the incentives for strategic behavior and facilitate the formation of networks with desirable global properties.
Discipline
Business | Computer Sciences | OS and Networks
Research Areas
Information Systems and Management
Publication
1st Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems (P2PEcon), 5-6 June 2003, Berkely, CA
First Page
1
Last Page
5
City or Country
Berkeley, CA
Citation
WOODARD, C. Jason and PARKES, David C..
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Ad Hoc Network Formation. (2003). 1st Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems (P2PEcon), 5-6 June 2003, Berkely, CA. 1-5.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/825
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/econcs/pubs/woodard03adhoc.pdf