Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
4-2011
Abstract
A signcryption scheme allows a sender to produce a ciphertext for a receiver so that both confidentiality and non-repudiation can be ensured. It is built to be more efficient and secure, for example, supporting insider security, when compared with the conventional sign-then-encrypt approach. In this paper, we propose a new notion called heterogeneous signcryption in which the sender has an identity-based secret key while the receiver is holding a certificate-based public key pair. Heterogeneous signcryption is suitable for practical scenarios where an identity-based user, who does not have a personal certificate or a public key, wants to communicate securely with a server which has a certificate with its public key. We propose two constructions and show their security under the model we define in the random oracle model. The model we define captures the insider security for both confidentiality and unforgeability. Both of the schemes also support public verifiability and key privacy, that is, an adversary cannot find out who the sender and receiver are from a ciphertext in the insider security model. The second scheme is the most efficient one computationally among all key-privacy-preserving signcryption schemes even when compared with schemes in an identity-based cryptographic setting or certificate-based public key setting.
Keywords
key privacy, ciphertext anonymity, identity-based cryptography
Discipline
Information Security
Research Areas
Information Systems and Management
Publication
Computer Journal
Volume
54
Issue
4
First Page
525
Last Page
536
ISSN
0010-4620
Identifier
10.1093/comjnl/bxq095
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP): Policy B - Oxford Open Option B
Citation
HUANG, Qiong; WONG, Duncan S.; and YANG, Guomin.
Heterogeneous signcryption with key privacy. (2011). Computer Journal. 54, (4), 525-536.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/7442
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
http://doi.org/10.1093/comjnl/bxq095