Publication Type
Conference Proceeding Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
4-2006
Abstract
Digital signature is one of the most important primitives in public key cryptography. It provides authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation to many kinds of applications. On signer privacy however, it is generally unclear or suspicious of whether a signature scheme itself can guarantee the anonymity of the signer. In this paper, we give some affirmative answers to it. We formally define the signer anonymity for digital signature and propose some schemes of this type. We show that a signer anonymous signature scheme can be very useful by proposing a new anonymous key exchange protocol which allows a client Alice to establish a session key with a server Bob securely while keeping her identity secret from eavesdroppers. In the protocol, the anonymity of Alice is already maintained when Alice sends her signature to Bob in clear, and no additional encapsulation or mechanism is needed for the signature. We also propose a method of using anonymous signature to solve the collusion problem between organizers and reviewers of an anonymous paper review system.
Keywords
Signature Scheme, Random Oracle, Mobile Client, Message Space, Digital Signature Scheme
Discipline
Information Security
Research Areas
Information Systems and Management
Publication
Public Key Cryptography: 9th International Conference on Theory and Practice of Public-Key Cryptography, PKC 2006, New York, April 24-26
Volume
3958
First Page
347
Last Page
363
ISBN
9783540338512
Identifier
10.1007/11745853_23
Publisher
Springer
City or Country
Cham
Citation
YANG, Guomin; WONG, Duncan S.; DENG, Xiaotie; and WANG, Huaxiong.
Anonymous signature schemes. (2006). Public Key Cryptography: 9th International Conference on Theory and Practice of Public-Key Cryptography, PKC 2006, New York, April 24-26. 3958, 347-363.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/7438
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1007/11745853_23