Publication Type

Conference Proceeding Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

3-2011

Abstract

We initiate the formal study on authenticated key exchange (AKE) under bad randomness. This could happen when (1) an adversary compromises the randomness source and hence directly controls the randomness of each AKE session; and (2) the randomness repeats in different AKE sessions due to reset attacks. We construct two formal security models, Reset-1 and Reset-2, to capture these two bad randomness situations respectively, and investigate the security of some widely used AKE protocols in these models by showing that they become insecure when the adversary is able to manipulate the randomness. On the positive side, we propose simple but generic methods to make AKE protocols secure in Reset-1 and Reset-2 models. The methods work in a modular way: first, we strengthen a widely used AKE protocol to achieve Reset-2 security, then we show how to transform any Reset-2 secure AKE protocol to a new one which also satisfies Reset-1 security.

Keywords

Authenticated Key Exchange, Resettable Cryptography, Bad Randomness

Discipline

Information Security

Research Areas

Cybersecurity

Publication

Financial Cryptography and Data Security: 15th International Conference, FC 2011, Gros Islet, St. Lucia, February 28 - March 4: Proceedings

Volume

7035

First Page

113

Last Page

126

ISBN

9783642275753

Identifier

10.1007/978-3-642-27576-0_10

Publisher

Springer

City or Country

Cham

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27576-0_10

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