Publication Type

Conference Proceeding Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

7-2017

Abstract

Secret handshake allows a group of authorized users to establish a shared secret key and at the same time authenticate each other anonymously. A straightforward approach to design an unlinkable secret handshake protocol is to use either long-term certificate or one-time certificate provided by a trusted authority. However, how to detect the misusing of certificates by an insider adversary is a challenging security issue when using those approaches for unlinkable secret handshake. In this paper, we propose a novel k-time authenticated secret handshake (k-ASH) protocol where each authorized user is only allowed to use the credential for k times. We formalize security models, including session key security and anonymity, for k-ASH, and prove the security of the proposed protocol under some computational problems which are proved hard in the generic bilinear group model. The proposed protocol also achieved public traceability property if a user misuses the k-time credential.

Keywords

Generic bilinear group model, Insider adversary, k-time authentication, Public traceability, Unlinkable secret handshake

Discipline

Information Security

Research Areas

Information Systems and Management

Publication

Proceedings of the 22nd Australasian Conference, Auckland, New Zealand, 2017 July 3-5

Volume

10343

First Page

281

Last Page

300

ISBN

9783319598697

Identifier

10.1007/978-3-319-59870-3_16

Publisher

Springer Verlag

City or Country

Auckland, New Zealand

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59870-3_16

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