Publication Type
Conference Proceeding Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
6-2016
Abstract
In this paper, we present the notion of recipient-revocable identity-based broadcast encryption scheme. In this notion, a content provider will produce encrypted content and send them to a third party (which is a broadcaster). This third party will be able to revoke some identities from the ciphertext. We present a security model to capture these requirements, as well as a concrete construction. The ciphertext consists of k + 3 group elements, assuming that the maximum number of revocation identities is k. That is, the ciphertext size is linear in the maximal size of R, where R is the revocation identity set. However, we say that the additional elements compared to that from an IBBE scheme are only for the revocation but not for decryption. Therefore, the ciphertext sent to the users for decryption will be of constant size (i.e.,3 group elements). Finally, we present the proof of security of our construction.
Keywords
Constant Size, Identity-based Broadcast Encryption, Recipients, Revocation
Discipline
Information Security
Research Areas
Information Systems and Management
Publication
Proceedings of the 11th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Xi’an, China, 2016 May 30-June 03
First Page
201
Last Page
210
ISBN
9781450342339
Identifier
10.1145/2897845.2897848
Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery, Inc
City or Country
Xi'an
Citation
SUSILO, Willy; YANG, Guomin; CHEN, Rongmao; MU, Yi; GUO, Fuchun; and CHOW, Yang-Wai.
Recipient revocable identity-based broadcast encryption: How to revoke some recipients in IBBE without knowledge of the plaintext. (2016). Proceedings of the 11th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Xi’an, China, 2016 May 30-June 03. 201-210.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/7366
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
http://doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897848