Publication Type

Conference Proceeding Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

11-2012

Abstract

Designated verifier signatures (DVS) allow a signer to create a signature whose validity can only be verified by a specific entity chosen by the signer. In addition, the chosen entity, known as the designated verifier, cannot convince any body that the signature is created by the signer. Multi-designated verifiers signatures (MDVS) are a natural extension of DVS in which the signer can choose multiple designated verifiers. DVS and MDVS are useful primitives in electronic voting and contract signing. In this paper, we investigate various aspects of MDVS and make two contributions. Firstly, we revisit the notion of unforgeability under rogue key attack on MDVS. In this attack scenario, a malicious designated verifier tries to forge a signature that passes through the verification of another honest designated verifier. A common counter-measure involves making the knowledge of secret key assumption (KOSK) in which an adversary is required to produce a proof-of-knowledge of the secret key. We strengthened the existing security model to capture this attack and propose a new construction that does not rely on the KOSK assumption. Secondly, we propose a generic construction of strong MDVS

Keywords

designated verifier signature, public key cryptography, rogue key attack

Discipline

Information Security | OS and Networks

Research Areas

Information Systems and Management

Publication

Proceedings of the 6th International Conference, Wuyishan, Fujian, China, 2012 November 21-23

Volume

26

Issue

8

First Page

1574

Last Page

1592

ISBN

9783642346002

Identifier

10.1002/cpe.3094

Publisher

Springer

City or Country

Wuyishan, Fujian, China

Additional URL

http://doi.org/10.1002/cpe.3094

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