Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
12-2019
Abstract
Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols allow two (or multiple) parties to authenticate each other and agree on a common secret key, which is essential for establishing a secure communication channel over a public network. AKE protocols form a central component in many network security standards such as IPSec, TLS/SSL, and SSH. However, it has been demonstrated that many standardized AKE protocols are vulnerable to side-channel and key leakage attacks. In order to defend against such attacks, leakage resilient (LR-) AKE protocols have been proposed in the literature. Nevertheless, most of the existing LR-AKE protocols only focused on the resistance to long-term key leakage, while in reality leakage of ephemeral secret key (or randomness) can also occur due to various reasons such as the use of poor randomness sources or insecure pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs). In this paper, we revisit the strongly leakage resilient AKE protocol (CT-RSA'16) that aimed to resist challenge-dependent leakage on both long-term and ephemeral secret keys. We show that there is a security issue in the design of the protocol and propose an improved version that can fix the problem. In addition, we extend the protocol to a more general framework that can be efficiently instantiated under various assumptions, including hybrid instantiations that can resist key leakage attacks while preserving session key security against future quantum machines.
Keywords
Authenticated key exchange, Key leakage, Weak randomness
Discipline
Databases and Information Systems | Information Security
Research Areas
Information Systems and Management
Publication
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Volume
87
Issue
12
First Page
2885
Last Page
2911
ISSN
0925-1022
Identifier
10.1007/s10623-019-00656-3
Publisher
Springer (part of Springer Nature): Springer Open Choice Hybrid Journals
Citation
YANG, Guomin; CHEN, Rongmao; MU, Yi; SUSILO, Willy; GUO Fuchun; and LI, Jie.
Strongly leakage resilient authenticated key exchange, revisited. (2019). Designs, Codes and Cryptography. 87, (12), 2885-2911.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/7303
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
http://doi.org/10.1007/s10623-019-00656-3